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The law of actions is the last of the three subjects in the institutional scheme, 
and is quite different from the subjects that precede it. While the earlier 
subjects are concerned with substantive rules, the law of actions is concerned 
with redress. It is not quite the same as ‘the law of procedure’, however; it 
often includes matters that might easily have been treated under the law of 
persons or of things. This is because actions evolved as a subject over a time 
when procedure was not distinct from substantive law. 
I. ‘Action’  (J.4.6 pr; 4.15) 
The word ‘action’ is awkward to define, not because its meaning is hard to 2 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
understand from any one example, but because it appears in many different 
contexts and therefore evades any one definition. In Latin the word is actio, 
from the verb agere, which for our purposes is best translated broadly: ‘to 
urge’. Generally, to have an action means that a person is entitled to pursue a 
remedy for some injustice done to him. If, for example, a person has been a 
victim of fraud, he might be allowed an actio de dolo, an ‘action for fraud’. 
This would entitle him to go before a judge and to urge the judge to give him 
relief. 
From this example it might seem that an action is in fact a ‘right’, and that 
when we say a person is entitled to pursue a remedy we are saying that he has 
a right to relief. But to equate an action with a right is to substitute a concept 
that we appreciate easily, but that the Romans came to appreciate only over 
time. We have no difficulty in understanding that a person under certain 
circumstances has a right (for example, when he is injured), that that right has 
an existence in the abstract, and that it is the function of the judicial machinery 
– the judges, tribunals, rules of procedure and evidence – to transform that 
right into a remedy. But in a system where the substantive law often speaks in 
the language of procedure (‘If it appears that X ought to give 10 to Y, the 
judge shall condemn for 10’), and where procedure is not seen as something 
necessarily separate from the rest of the law, this sort of abstraction does not 
come easily.
1 Under such a system, someone who has suffered a wrong will 
probably see himself, not as a person with some abstract entitlement to be 
made whole, but as a person who is entitled to clear a procedural hurdle. This 
is made very plain <209> in the classical definition of actio (Celsus, 
D.44.7.51) which Justinian uses at J.4.6 pr, a definition that has certain 
shortcomings but otherwise conveys well the limited notion of an action: ‘An 
action is nothing but a right to go to court to get one’s due.’
2 This statement 
shows clearly that an action, if it is a right at all, is more a right to proceed 
than a right to prevail, and that any definition of ‘action’ ought to put process 
at the fore. Accordingly, actio is often translated as ‘claim’ or (circuitously) as 
‘right of action’, to show that a person, on presenting certain facts, will be 
 
[Note: in the original work, endnotes commence on page <227>] 
1  See generally P. Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement 
(London, 1984) pp. 128-9; H.F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law (Oxford, 1957) 
pp. 66-81. 
2  The flaw in the definition is that ‘one’s due’ (quod sibi debetur) seems to exclude real 
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allowed to follow a certain procedural agenda appropriate to those facts. That 
person hopes, but is not assured, that this agenda will culminate in the granting 
of relief. In English the word ‘warrant’ also has something of actio in this 
sense. 
For our purposes it is satisfactory to define an action as a claim or a 
warrant. At the same time it is worth mentioning that actio appears in contexts 
in which the meaning is either more broad or more refined, and where ‘claim’ 
or ‘warrant’ will not work. 
(1) To describe an action as a claim or warrant gives the impression that an 
action requires the intervention of the state. Yet the word actio may describe a 
purely private event, as for example in D.48.1.7 (Macer), where actio is used 
to describe simply the act of a person, an act which (in this context) brings 
disgrace upon that person if it becomes the subject of certain proceedings. An 
important example of actio as a private event is self-help. An actio may 
describe not only the pursuit of a remedy with the sanction of the state, but 
also the act of an individual privately vindicating a wrong done to him. In the 
earlier forms of Roman procedure, for example, there existed actions for 
seizing a person or his property – the legis actio per manus iniectionem and 
legis actio per pignoris capionem (G.4.21 – 29) – that a person might resort to 
without prior litigation. 
Self-help is not a particularly significant institution in the developed law of 
actions, but is nevertheless important for illustrating the essence of the word 
‘action’. Roman law did not draw a firm line between a person’s real and 
formal claim, that is, between the claim a person possesses simply by virtue of 
being wronged, and the claim recognised by a court.
3 Thus a person might 
possess a claim for redress even if the judicial machinery had not yet granted it 
to him. 
(2) In their treatments of actions, both Gaius and Justinian discuss a great 
deal more than simply ‘claims’, and for this reason we often understand the 
idea of ‘actions’ quite broadly. Gaius, for example, devotes a fair amount of 
space to procedure, and even discusses a form of procedure that was all but 
unused in his own time. Justinian, though he does not speak directly about the 
earlier forms of procedure (which were obsolete by his time), does speak 
about more general matters of litigation, for example, pleading, interdicts, and 
judges. And in our other sources we find definitions of ‘actio’ that are very 
 
3  H. Honsell, T. Mayer-Maly and W. Selb, Römisches Recht 4th ed. (Berlin, 1987) p. 218 
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broad (see e.g. Ulpian, D.44.7.37), generally encompassing the various ways 
of presenting issues to a tribunal. For <210> these reasons ‘actions’ is 
sometimes treated as synonymous with ‘procedure’ or ‘remedies’. 
The two instances of actio just discussed – ‘private act’ and ‘procedure’ – 
are cited in order to show that ‘action’ may sometimes mean something more 
general than ‘claim’. In other contexts it is used in exactly the opposite way, to 
indicate not simply a claim, but a particular kind of claim: 
(3) An action is sometimes distinguished from an interdict. ‘Interdict’ 
describes several decrees issued by magistrates and often used to confer or 
protect possession. They were highly procedural in character; it would be 
difficult to discuss the ‘substantive law of interdicts’, because an interdict was 
a specific order granted on the presentation of specific facts. What 
distinguishes an interdict from an action (as described here) is principally the 
fact that an interdict, in form, is virtually a remedy in itself. The magistrate 
does not, as in an ordinary action, summarise the dispute and pass it on to 
someone else for resolution, but instead issues a decree himself. The decree, it 
is true, might not be the end of the matter, instead often requiring the 
resolution of a judge, or serving as a predicate for a subsequent action. But the 
interdict alone, as a decree issued directly by the magistrate, was 
administrative in character, and was therefore distinguishable from an action. 
Justinian offers several different ways to classify interdicts (J.4.15); the 
possessory interdicts and their three divisions are worth mentioning briefly. 
These interdicts have in common the feature that each culminates in the grant 
of possession in favour of a party. The first possessory interdict is for 
obtaining possession, and Justinian’s example is an interdict that arises in the 
context of succession law (J.4.15.3). This interdict existed as a part of the 
praetor’s efforts to alter the scheme of succession under the state law with a 
scheme (bonorum possessio) based to a greater extent on blood relationship 
(see Chapter 4, section III(c) above). A person favoured by the praetor’s 
innovations who wished to obtain possession of the tangible assets of the 
estate could request from the praetor an ‘interdict quorum bonorum’. The 
interdict took the form of an order to the person in possession – in this case a 
person without title or who claimed to possess as heir – directing that person 
to restore the property to the other. Even though the interdict determined the 
question of possession and nothing else, this would often be the end of the 
dispute: efforts to establish ownership of the property against the new 
possessor (if the grant of bonorum possessio were of a certain character) 
would be fruitless. 
The situation was different under the second division of the possessory 
interdicts, those for retaining possession. Here the interdicts often served only 5 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
as a procedural step in advance of a proper action for ownership, and not as a 
final remedy. In other words, these interdicts were very much part of a pretrial 
tactic, made necessary by the characteristics of the ownership action. 
In a perfect system of litigation, we would expect a tribunal to listen 
<211> equally to competing claims for ownership and give judgment in favour 
of the better claim. But in the Roman system, as in modern systems, a plaintiff 
carries the burden of proof, and proving ownership is not an easy matter, 
particularly where no system of public registration exists. This means that if a 
person had the freedom to do so he would choose to be a defendant and not a 
plaintiff, leaving it to his opponent to prove ownership. The possessory 
interdicts, to a certain extent, allowed such a choice: if a party could put 
himself in possession of the disputed property, it was then left to his opponent 
to bring suit and try to establish ownership. Thus the battle for ownership 
might be preceded by a battle for possession (J.4.15.4). 
In the case of immoveables, the battle for possession might begin with the 
pronouncement of an interdict uti possidetis. This would consist of a decree 
addressed to both parties, stating that force could not be used to dispossess 
whichever of the parties was innocently in possession of the property. After a 
complex course of proceedings, the party with the better claim under the 
words of the interdict would be awarded possession. This would put him in the 
more enviable position of defending rather than establishing ownership, if his 
opponent sought to claim ownership in a further proceeding. In Justinian’s 
time the interdict utrubi, applying to moveables, operated in the same way, 
although in the classical law the phrasing of the interdict was slightly 
different; it allowed an innocent possessor not only to retain possession, but to 
recover possession that was recently lost (J.4.15.4a). 
The third kind of possessory interdict is for recovering possession. The 
Institutes gives the example of a person dispossessed of immoveable property 
by force (J.4.15.6). The interdict described there – the interdict unde vi – 
existed as two different interdicts in the classical law but was made uniform 
by Justinian’s time. The classical interdict unde vi was an order to restore 
immoveable property to an innocent possessor who had been evicted by force 
within the previous year. The classical interdict unde vi armata was directed 
against one who had dispossessed not only by force, but by armed men as 
well, and given the gravity of the act it was unnecessary to show that the 
dispossessed person had come by his possession innocently. In Justinian’s 
synthesis of these two interdicts, violent dispossession was enough disliked 
that an ejector could no longer challenge the innocence of the ejectee’s 
possession in any event. 
The taxonomy that distinguishes an action from an interdict is far from 6 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
perfect. In the Institutes Justinian (borrowing from Gaius) first says that ‘All 
our law is about persons, things, or actions’ (J.1.2.12), and later says ‘We look 
next at interdicts or the actions used instead of them’ (J.4.15 pr). It is 
important not to worry too much over this sort of inconsistency, but simply to 
recognise the basic difference between an action (a claim) and an interdict 
(an administrative remedy). 
(4) There are other so-called ‘praetorian remedies’ that are often distin- 
<212> guished from actions. Like interdicts, these remedies were issued by 
the praetor himself, sometimes after a short inquiry, and sometimes after 
hearing only one party. There were various forms. For example, the praetor 
sometimes circumvented the law and restored parties to their previous 
positions, put a party in possession of the other party’s property as security, or 
exacted a promise from one party in favour of the other. Some of these 
remedies appear sporadically in the Institutes.
4 
(5) The three words actio petitio persecutio appear together in some 
contexts and are understood to refer to specific types of suits. In this narrow 
sense an actio refers to a personal action, petitio refers to a real action, and 
persecutio refers to a restorative action (according to Papinian, D.44.7.28), or 
to an extraordinary proceeding (according to Ulpian, D.50.16.178.2). The 
most familiar occurrence of these three words is in the so-called Aquilian 
stipulation, described at J.3.29.2 (see Chapter 5, section IX above). They also 
appear in some legislation (see the lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae, chapters 
125-132, passim). 
II.  The Formulary Procedure 
From the 2nd century BC until the 3rd century AD, most Roman litigation was 
conducted according to what is called the ‘formulary procedure’. The subject 
is omitted from the Institutes but discussed at length by Gaius. It is difficult to 
give any account of actions without at least a sketch of the formulary 
procedure; the subject of actions owes a great deal to its influence. Of course 
‘claims’ existed long before it was created and continued to exist long after it 
was abolished. But actions as Gaius and Justinian present them are not simply 
lists of claims. They are claims that are classified with great acuteness and 
 
4  See P.G. Stein, ‘“Equitable” Remedies for the Protection of Property’, in P. <228> 
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expressed with great technical precision. Their classifications are due partly to 
the formulary procedure, and their expression is due almost entirely to it. 
Roman litigation was conducted in two phases. The first phase was public, 
conducted before a magistrate of the state, the praetor or aedile, charged with 
administering justice. The second phase was private, conducted before a 
judge, a private individual who need not have been a lawyer. The public phase 
was very brief; the magistrate would simply determine whether the litigants 
should be allowed to proceed and, if so, what form their action should take. 
The private phase was the trial itself. 
The magistrate needed a scheme for determining which claims would be 
allowed to go forward. His duties would have become impossible if he had 
had to consult treatises and legislation and make a fresh decision on the 
suitability of every claim. Accordingly he maintained and put on display a 
long list announcing his intentions and expectations regarding the lawsuits he 
would allow. This list, the edict, contained individual entries describing the 
actions which he was willing to grant. If a litigant came before him and 
requested one of the actions, the magistrate would ordinar- <213> ily grant it 
(though he might deny under certain circumstances, for example on account of 
res judicata). If the litigant’s circumstances did not match any of the entries, 
he might persuade the magistrate to invent a new claim and allow it to go 
before a judge. If the magistrate saw fit, he might even incorporate the new 
claim in the edict for future cases. 
The passing of the suit from the magistrate to the judge was an act that 
required great care. The principal problem was the judge’s peculiar standing 
within the legal system. The judge did not hold office, but was appointed for 
service in a single case, and selected personally by the parties if possible. He 
had no special qualifications other than his wealth. He was simply a private 
individual who conducted the trial without even intermittent guidance from the 
state. The consequences were (1) he required detailed written instructions at 
the outset, and (2) what he did with those instructions – his conduct of the 
trial, his judgment – was of no enduring importance whatsoever to the legal 
system. 
This meant that the final, formal act of the state, the final expression of the 
law in a given case, was the set of instructions that the magistrate gave to the 
judge. These instructions, from one perspective, were the parties’ pleadings, as 
they contained their allegations, the matters they hoped to prove. But because 
the allegations had to satisfy the requirements of the law as determined by the 
magistrate, they came into the judge’s hands in a technical form, a form that 
permitted relief under the law. This makes the instructions the single most 
important item in the lawsuit, far more important than the judgment. A 8 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
judgment declaring who won or lost could have little value compared to these 
instructions which, under this public/private system of litigation, necessarily 
recited for the judge’s benefit the kernel of the dispute: what a party had to 
show in order to win. 
The instructions were prepared according to formulae, composed of 
‘specially prepared phrases’ (G.4.30). Each formula was divided into parts, 
and each part had a particular function. Very few actual formulae survive; one 
of the few that does survive is below. It was found near Pompeii and dates 
from the first century AD:
5 
C. Blossius Celadus shall be the judge. If it appears that C. Marcius 
Saturninus ought to give 18,000 sesterces to C. Sulpicius Cinnamus, which 
is the matter in dispute, C. Blossius Celadus, the judge, shall condemn C. 
Marcius Saturninus for 18,000 sesterces in favour of C. Sulpicius Cinnamus; 
otherwise he shall absolve. 
This formula describes an action called a condictio certae pecuniae, a personal 
claim for a particular sum of money. It was the appropriate action in cases 
where, among other things, a person had given a stipulation to pay money to 
another. We are able to classify formulae in this way and pair certain formulae 
with certain actions because each different formulae was <214> drafted with a 
significant form of words. One part of the formula, the intentio (or ‘principal 
pleading’), is particularly revealing in this respect. The intentio in the formula 
above is the phrase ‘If it appears that C. Marcius Saturninus ought to give 
18,000 sesterces to C. Sulpicius Cinnamus ….’ The word ‘if’ tells us the claim 
is for a certain sum (quite apart from the appearance of the sum itself), and the 
word ‘ought’ tells us it is an action for a debt. If the words are altered, the 
action is altered. If the sum promised by the stipulation were uncertain, the 
formula would not order the judge to condemn 18,000 ‘if Cinnamus owes 
18,000’, but to condemn ‘whatever Cinnamus owes’. The ‘whatever’ in the 
intentio indicates a claim for an uncertain sum. And the altered formula 
produces a different action, the actio incerti ex stipulatu. 
Nearly every action is associated with a unique formula.
6 This means that 
one usually describes, classifies, and analyses different actions by addressing 
the formulae that describe each action. 
 
5  L’année épigraphique (1973) no. 155. 
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III.  The Law of Actions 
It is not easy to understand how actions could constitute a subject by 
themselves. Under the heading ‘law of actions’ one might expect to find a list 
of actions with a description of each action, in the form ‘if X injures Y in such 
a way, X will compensate Y to such a degree.’ But this sort of list would be 
useful only if all the law were expressed in the form of individual actions. 
That is, in a legal system such as the Institutes describe, where actions 
constitute only one subdivision of the law, we would not expect the law of 
actions to be a list of every action. In such a system there is no reason to 
discuss, for example, the depositor’s action, the ward’s action, or the 
vindicatory action as subjects apart from deposit, guardianship, or ownership. 
Therefore the law of actions – at least as it appears in the institutes of Gaius 
and Justinian – cannot be a list of actions, but must exist somehow as a subject 
apart from the underlying substantive rules. 
As a subject ‘actions’ never stayed the same for very long, but changed as 
its relationship with the substantive rules changed. For this reason the subject 
has a very different character in different historical periods. In the beginning, 
actions very possibly encompassed most of the law. By Justinian’s time, 
actions in the classical sense of ‘claim’ were so reduced in importance that 
much of what appears on the subject in the Institutes must be read as (1) a 
historical description of how matters were pleaded centuries earlier, or (2) 
something like a discussion of rights, in the modern sense. 
The customary view of actions in the earliest law was expressed famously 
by Henry Maine (1822-88). He does not refer directly to Rome at the time of 
the Twelve Tables, although he seems to have had it in mind, among other 
examples:
7 <215> 
The primary distinction between the early and rude, and the modern and 
refined, classifications of legal rules, is that the Rules relating to Actions, to 
pleading and procedure, fall into a subordinate place and become, as 
Bentham called them, Adjective Law. So far as this the Roman Institutional 
writers had advanced, since they put the Law of Actions into the third and 
last compartment of their system. Nobody should know better than an 
Englishman that this is not an arrangement which easily and spontaneously 
suggests itself to the mind. So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions 
in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look 
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of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early 
lawyer can only see the law through the envelope of its technical forms. 
Maine writes in a 19th-century style that produces memorable language, but at 
the expense of authorities and accuracy. We can nevertheless take his general 
point: rules in earlier Roman law were often expressed according to the 
remedial steps to be followed. The Twelve Tables have many examples of 
rules expressed in this way, e.g., 
Table 1, 14. If he has broken the bone of a free man, let the penalty be 300. If of a 
slave, 150. 
Table 8, 11. Anyone who allows himself to be a witness or serve as a holder of the 
balances and then does not stand by his evidence will be untrustworthy and 
incompetent as a witness. 
Table 11, 2. If a slave commits theft or causes damage, [he shall be given noxally]. 
Of course not all of the rules in the Twelve Tables are expressed in this way, 
and there are even good arguments to the effect that the Twelve Tables is 
nothing like what Maine describes.
8 But to whatever extent the Twelve Tables 
is dominated by procedure and remedies, it is clear this is not an effective way 
to present the law. The main criticism is that this sort of presentation is 
unreflective, that it leaps immediately to the question ‘how much?’ without 
stopping long to consider ‘who is the wrongdoer?’ or ‘what is the wrong?’. A 
more reflective method of presenting laws would group similar rules together 
and consider in mass the substantive components – the ‘whos’ and the ‘whats’ 
– of each rule. This would allow a person better to classify a given set of facts 
as a particular kind of legal event. It is therefore something to be admired 
when, for example, jurists and legislators take up the events described under 
the first and third examples above, consider those events separately from any 
particular remedy, and then discuss them under the common rubric of delict. 
And that is Maine’s point: that with time, the underlying substantive ideas 
were more frequently discussed and expressed as subjects apart from 
litigation, thus producing a more refined method of classification. 
The law of actions is very much a function of this gradual division of 
 
8  A. Watson, ‘The Law of Actions and the Development of Substantive Law in the Early 
Roman Republic’, LQR 89 (1973) pp. 387-92. Watson generally maintains that there was a 
‘strict Roman separation of substantive law and procedure’. A. Watson, ‘The Structure of 
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<216> substantive law from procedure. If we imagine a system where the 
entire law is expressed in the form of actions, ‘the law of actions’ would be 
synonymous with ‘the law’. As the substantive law underlying the actions is 
gradually set apart for separate discussion, what remains behind is a residue of 
procedure, remedies, and as yet undisentangled substantive law. For lack of a 
better term we might call this the ‘law of actions’. How closely this model in 
fact describes the development of Roman law is a matter of debate. Some, 
notably Watson, insist that Roman law scrupulously divided substantive law 
from procedure, even as early as the Twelve Tables. Others find the model 
accurate, but rely heavily on the example of English law, where the evidence 
provides a better illustration of Maine’s statement. Plunkett, for example, in 
trying to account for the ‘monstrous distortion’ in Bracton’s De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae, where actions constitute three-quarters of the whole 
treatise, resorts to the example of the Institutes: ‘As a legal system develops 
more and more matter gets transferred from the law of actions to the law of 
obligations or of things until, finally, actions are reduced to the comparatively 
modest place accorded them in [Justinian’s] Institutes’.
9 
Whatever was the true development of Roman actions, the law of actions 
that Gaius presents in the 2nd century AD is very much a ‘residuary’ division 
of the law in a way the law of persons and of things are not. The various 
components that make up the law of actions were not introduced by some 
superior intelligence, seeking to improve actions as a subdiscipline of the law. 
Instead, the law of actions comprises what is left over after centuries of 
picking away, of reallocation to the other divisions of the law. This means that 
actions is not a well-ordered subject, and instead of giving an integral whole 
with neat subdivisions, it frequently presents individual items of 
supplementary information that could not be fitted in elsewhere. 
Aside from omitting discussion of formulae and actions in the law, 
Justinian presents a law of actions similar to Gaius’. Yet between the time of 
Gaius and Justinian, the idea of an action underwent a great deal of change.
10 
The formulary procedure, long abolished by Justinian’s time, had given a 
certain amount of clarity to actions: a given entry on the praetor’s edict would 
correspond to a particular action, and as long as justice was pursued by 
application to the praetor for a claim from the edict, the character of individual 
 
9  T.F.T. Plunkett, Early English Legal Literature (Cambridge, 1958) p. 51. 
10  On what follows, see P. Stein, ‘The Development of the Institutional System’, in Stein 
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actions would continue to be important. As the formulary procedure gave way 
to the new imperial procedure, however, a litigant no longer pursued a 
particular action, but rather presented facts which he believed would support a 
claim for relief under the law. 
During the same period there was a broader change in the way actions 
were regarded. As mentioned above, in the classical law to have an action 
meant that a person was entitled to legal process. From there, however, it was 
only a short step to see an action as something that ‘attached’ to a person, a 
credit in his favour, as it was a debit against his opponent. This <217> new 
conception of an action became more prevalent in the centuries between Gaius 
and Justinian. If an action was a ‘credit’ to a person, and if at the same time 
that action was no longer tied to a particular remedy, then an action was very 
much like what we regard as a ‘right’. 
To the Romans this new action/right seemed to have much in common 
with an obligation – the condition of one person owing another – and not 
surprisingly this results in some confusion between obligations and actions. 
Both the Digest (D.44.7) and the Codex (C.4.10) have titles that are headed 
‘On Obligations and Actions’. Also, one of the compilers of the Institutes, in a 
Greek paraphrase of the work, sought to justify obligations as an introduction 
to actions by remarking that ‘obligations are the mother of actions’ 
(Theophilus,  Paraphrase 3.13). This confusion between obligations and 
actions continued into modern times. It was common even until the 18th 
century to regard the three principal divisions of the law, not as persons, 
things, and actions, but as persons, things (principally corporeal), and 
obligations and actions.
11 
Although the idea of an action had altered by Justinian’s time, Justinian by 
and large presents the various classifications of actions as they appeared in the 
classical law. These classifications tell us a great deal about the law. As Gaius 
and Justinian present it, the law of actions asks us to take a step back from the 
specific actions themselves, to examine them somewhat apart from the facts 
under which each developed, and to describe the ways in which they differ 
from or resemble one another. Standing back from and analysing actions in 
this way results in divisions of the law quite different from the divisions 
presented under the law of persons and of things. For example, under the law 
of things we might distinguish a contract as either ‘by conduct’ or ‘by 
agreement’, while under the law of actions we might distinguished a contract 
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as either ‘strict law’ or ‘good faith’. The law of actions often ignores the 
substantive boundaries altogether; a restorative action, for example, might 
arise under either contract or delict. 
The principal classifications are given below. It is one of the awkward 
things about the law of actions that each classification is based on a different 
premise. Real and personal actions are distinguished by the rights to be 
enforced. State-law and honorary actions are distinguished by the source of the 
law. Penal, restorative, and hybrid actions are distinguished by the object of 
the litigation. Each classification addresses a different component of the 
underlying law. 
IV.  Real and Personal Actions (J.4.6.1 – 15, 20) 
If someone were to write a new Institutes that expressed all of the law in the 
language of actions, at the top of the hierarchy would be the division between 
personal (in personam) actions and real (in rem) actions. All <218> claims 
may be classified as one or the other, and the difference between the two types 
of claim is very much a matter of substantive law: a real action reflects a 
relationship between a person and property, and a personal action reflects a 
relationship between persons. The fact that a matter of substantive law is 
expressed as a difference in actions reflects the preference of the classical 
Romans for the language of remedies over the notion of rights. 
A personal action arises from debt, and a real action arises from 
ownership. If, for example, a person receives money in payment for goods, 
insults another person, or damages another person’s property, a debt arises 
between two people. If the matter comes to litigation, a claim is asserted by 
one person against the other. We say that the claim is personal, not because the 
litigation is between persons (it always is), but because the relationship being 
urged is one that exists between persons. Litigation over ownership, on the 
other hand, looks outwardly the same (person against person), but is based on 
something different. If a person loses possession of property that he owns and 
brings a claim to assert his ownership, this claim is in rem, because the 
relationship being urged is one that exists between a person and a thing. 
The distinction was reflected clearly in the respective formulae. Typically 
the intentio in the formula of a real action would not mention the defendant. 
Instead, the issue would be framed purely in terms of the disputed ownership: 
Does the property belong to the plaintiff by Quiritary right (ex iure Quiritium 
esse)? Does he own the right (ius esse) to the fruits? In a personal action, the 14 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
intentio typically did mention the defendant, reciting the issue with the formal 
language of debt: Should the defendant give (dare oportere) 1,000 sesterces to 
the plaintiff? Should the defendant do something for or give something to 
(dare facere oportere) the plaintiff on account of a prior stipulatio between 
them? 
Real actions existed to enforce many kinds of ownership. Aside from the 
familiar example, the claim for ownership of a thing (rei vindicatio), there 
were claims for the ownership of an inheritance (hereditatis petitio), of a 
usufruct (vindicatio usufructus), of a right to draw water (aquae ductus), and 
many more. Real actions also existed not to enforce ownership but to deny it. 
An owner of land who wished to deny another’s ownership of a usufruct or 
servitude might bring the appropriate ‘actio negatoria’, a real action. In all of 
these real actions it is important to remember that a plaintiff does not seek the 
return of the thing. The judge, as always, is limited to giving a remedy in 
money damages, and the description ‘real’ refers only to the underlying 
relationship the plaintiff is attempting to establish. Of course as a practical 
matter, where the praetor inserts a special provision allowing restitution at the 
judge’s direction, a plaintiff might have the thing restored, but this had nothing 
to do with the fact that the action was real. 
Personal actions are described in the Institutes by a clever and terse <219> 
piece of reasoning which Justinian borrows from Gaius (J.4.6.14; G.4.4): 
personal actions are only suitable for parties who deserve to get something, 
not for parties who own something and want it back; if you deserve to get it, a 
priori it isn’t yours. The number of personal actions is of course very large, 
and the most familiar of them are those based on contract or delict. Among the 
more familiar of the remaining actions are the action against a guardian for 
breach of duty (actio tutelae, inquiring what the defendant ‘ought to give or do 
for the plaintiff in accordance with good faith’), the action for production of a 
thing (actio ad exhibendum, inquiring whether the defendant ‘ought to 
produce the thing’), and the action to restore a dowry (actio rei uxoria, 
inquiring whether the defendant ‘ought to restore the dowry’). 
One of the consequences of dividing actions according to relationship is 
that, when a matter comes to litigation, the entire relationship, so to speak, is 
under review. This is clearest in the case of a real action. If an heir seeks to 
protect his inheritance by bringing a hereditatis petitio, the issue is whether 
the estate belongs to him under state law. If a person owns the right to channel 
water across certain land and his rights are interfered with, the issue is whether 
that person indeed owns the right to channel water. A person educated in the 
common law might prefer to see the issues here framed more narrowly (and in 
Roman terms, in personam), to inquire only whether someone had, for 15 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
example, wrongfully interfered with the assets of the estate or the flow of the 
water. But to a Roman, ownership is the issue, and ownership is therefore the 
idea to be championed. The common lawyer might suggest further that it is a 
waste of resources to do anything more than try to resolve the particular issue 
between the parties. The Roman would answer that the waste lies on the other 
side, that his ownership is ‘true’ not only against one opponent but against the 
whole world, and he should not have to wait until everyone in the world sues 
him and loses before he can regard something as his own. 
The situation is similar for personal actions, though only actions on 
contracts provide clear examples.
12 When a person sues on a contract, the 
relationship created by the contract is the subject of the action. The formula, 
after reciting the existence of the contract, will permit the judge to condemn 
the defendant ‘for whatever on that account the defendant ought to give to or 
do for the plaintiff’, or, if the matter involves a good-faith contract, ‘for 
whatever on that account the defendant in good faith ought to give to or do for 
the plaintiff’. The inquiry is much broader than the particular act – for 
example, the failure to pay or to hand over the goods – that brought the parties 
to court in the first place. In other words, the basis or ‘cause’ underlying a 
contractual action in personam is the debt created by the contract, not the 
particular act or breach that brought about the dispute. This will seem unusual 
to a common lawyer, who is accustomed to treating the breach of a contract, 
not the contract itself, as the basis of a lawsuit. And the consequences of the 
Roman treatment are severe; <220> unless a party protects himself by careful 
pleading, his right to sue on the same contract in the future will be consumed 
when issue is joined, in the same way the right of his common-law counterpart 
to sue on the same breach is consumed. 
V.  State-Law and Honorary Actions (J.4.6.3 – 13)  
The distinction between state-law and honorary actions is based on the source 
from which the claim is derived. In a system in which a magistrate has an 
independent power to create new claims, claims created within that power 
come to be distinguished from claims that are not so created. Claims based 
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upon the state law and unaltered by the magistrates’ intervention are called 
‘state-law actions’. The ‘state law’ in this context means the Twelve Tables 
and other legislation (including interpretations of those statutes), together with 
the rules developed by juristic practice. Claims of the magistrates’ creation are 
called honorary actions, and comprise actions in which the magistrate has 
exercised some degree of innovation, either by altering an existing state-law 
action (as in the Publician action) or in creating an entirely new action, not 
recognised as part of the state law (as in the actio de dolo). In Papinian’s 
phrase, the honorary law acts ‘to aid, supplement, or correct the state law, in 
the public interest’ (D.1.1.7.1). ‘Honorary’ is an adjective that means 
‘pertaining to the office of a magistrate’; it includes the office of both the 
praetor and aedile. 
A magistrate was called upon to innovate when an action under the state 
law did not speak to a particular problem or would not produce a satisfactory 
result, and his innovations took several forms. A common form was the 
‘fictitious formula’, a formula that directed the judge to accept as true 
something that was not. The most familiar example is the Publician action: a 
person who had lost possession of property and was not an owner under state 
law might be permitted to bring what amounted to an owner’s vindicatory 
action. It was a vindicatory action in all respects, except that it asked the judge 
to assume as true the falsehood that the plaintiff had satisfied the time limits of 
usucapion. (The Publician action was available both to bonitary owners and 
bona fide possessors, though by Justinian’s time bonitary ownership did not 
exist, and hence he speaks only of bona fide possessors at J.4.6.4.). Fictitious 
formulae were also used to good effect in lawsuits over inheritance. The state-
law rules for intestate succession operated narrowly in favour of agnates, and 
as a result an emancipated child, for example, would not take a share of his 
parent’s estate as heir, as one might expect. The praetor, however, innovated 
aggressively in this area, and in supplementing the state-law scheme by the 
institution of bonorum possessio, allowed the emancipated child to take the 
estate ‘as if an heir’ (G.4.34; see Chapter 4, section II(c) above). Fictions such 
as these allowed the praetor to be innovative without disturbing the law too 
much: <221> 
Roman fictions are common in two contexts, in pleadings and in legislation. 
Their function is the same in both, namely to extend a parcel of knowledge 
which is fixed and safe: we know exactly what happens when X is the case; 
now that Y is the case, we will proceed in exactly the same way, ‘as if the 17 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
case were X’. This is economical, cautious, and rigorous.
13 
A second way in which a magistrate innovated was by granting actions on 
the case. This type of innovation, as in the fictitious actions just described, was 
distinguished by a characteristic formula. But unlike a fictitious action, an 
action on the case might be highly creative and far-reaching. 
In a state-law action, the formula was ordinarily in ius concepta 
(‘conceived on the basis of the state law’). In practice this meant that the 
intentio of the formula was framed so as to recite a set of circumstances 
recognised in the state law. The formula in such an action would contain 
certain legally charged words, such as ‘duty’ (oportere), ‘belong’ (rem suam 
esse), ‘sell’ (vendere). In the buyer’s action, for example, the intentio would 
inquire ‘whereas the plaintiff bought from the defendant a thing which is the 
subject of this action …’. This recites the essence of a sale under state law, 
that the plaintiff bought a thing. A second example is the action for non-
manifest theft. Here the intentio would inquire ‘if it appears that the theft of 
the thing was carried out by the defendant, for which act the defendant ought 
to pay a penalty as thief …’. This language follows the offence of non-
manifest theft as recited in the Twelve Tables. 
In an action on the case, however, the intentio was drafted ‘on the facts’. 
This meant that the intentio would simply recite certain factual allegations, 
and would direct the judge to condemn if he found those allegations to be true. 
In such a case the judge was saved the trouble of investigating whether the 
plaintiff’s claim was made out under the rules of the state law. So, for 
example, the formula in an action for fraud recited certain hypothetical facts, 
such as ‘if it appears that the plaintiff [has suffered some harm] by the fraud of 
the defendant …’ If the judge found these facts to be true, he would condemn 
the defendant. 
We can see the value in this method of innovation by considering a 
particular action on the case, the actio de recepto.
14 If a shipmaster, innkeeper, 
or stablekeeper undertook to keep a person’s property safe, and then did not 
restore the property, the praetor would grant an action against him. (See 
Ulpian, D.4.9.1 pr, and Chapter 5, section VI above) It is surprising at first that 
the praetor saw fit to create this action, because there was no shortage of other 
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actions available. An undertaking to keep something safe might constitute a 
locatio conductio operis if undertaken for pay, or depositum if not, and each 
might provide a remedy if the thing were not returned. Also, if the property 
were stolen or damaged, an action for theft (Ulpian, D.47.5) or damage (Paul, 
D.4.9.6) might be available against the keeper, even if the act were committed 
by an employee of the <222> keeper. Yet the actio de recepto is a useful 
addition: where the loss was not a result of theft or damage, or the fault was 
not of a degree (dolus) to allow an actio depositi, a general-purpose action 
holding the keeper to his undertaking was desirable. It may have required a 
degree of accountability of the keeper that was simply not available under any 
other action (though whether this was true of locatio conductio is uncertain), 
and had the further advantage that it imposed an unforgiving standard of 
conduct on professions that were not held in high regard. 
Actions on the case were particularly useful in two areas of the law. First, 
they were of enormous importance under the Aquilian Act. Under the statute 
itself the requirement of causation was fairly narrow, restricted essentially to 
harm that was caused directly. The introduction of actions on the case allowed 
an aggrieved person to have a remedy even when the harm was caused 
indirectly. Second, a certain class of contractual actions on the case existed, 
called ‘actions with a special preface’ (actiones praescriptis verbis). These 
were praetorian extensions of the state-law actions on obligations contracted 
by conduct, and through these actions the praetor could recognise the 
existence of transactions that did not fit within one of the traditional categories 
of contract. Technically (and somewhat confusingly) these extensions were 
regarded as state-law actions themselves, as each was modelled closely on the 
contract it resembled. But the formulae were drafted as actions on the case: a 
demonstratio was added at the beginning (hence ‘special preface’), reciting the 
underlying facts of the transaction.
15  
Where a state-law action and an action on the case existed for the same 
underlying institution (as for the Aquilian Act), it was not always true that the 
action on the case was an innovation upon the state-law action. The difference, 
again, lay in the way the formulae were drafted, and we can take the example 
of the action for deposit. We know that, early on, the Twelve Tables allowed a 
penal action against a depositee under certain (unknown) circumstances. At 
some time during the early Republic the praetor recognised a new action on 
the case, the actio depositi in factum. As Gaius describes it (G.4.47), the action 
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looked something like this: 
If it appears that the plaintiff deposited a thing with the defendant and 
through the fraud of the defendant it has not been restored to the plaintiff, 
condemn the defendant to pay the plaintiff whatever the thing is worth. 
In creating this action the praetor probably recognised that the remedy under 
the Twelve Tables left something to be desired. Perhaps the Twelve Tables 
remedy was allowed only under narrow circumstances, or there was a need, 
apart from the existing penal remedy, for a new remedy allowing a depositor 
simply to recover the value of his property.
16 In any event, this action, with its 
formula drafted ‘on the facts’, was the result of praetorian innovation. In time 
the contract of deposit, with the help of juristic interpretation, came to be 
included among the so-called obligations con- <223> tracted by conduct and 
gave rise to an obligation under state law. And as with the other contracts in 
this category (except mutuum), a depositor might pursue a broadly grounded 
‘good faith’ state-law action. This action, as again Gaius describes it (G.4.47), 
looked something like this: 
Whereas the plaintiff deposited a thing with the defendant, whatever on that 
account the defendant ought to give to or do for the plaintiff in good faith, 
condemn the defendant. 
The state-law action for deposit was therefore a later creation than the action 
for deposit on the case. 
Because both state-law and honorary actions were administered by the 
same person, it is often difficult to draw a line between them. Schulz
17 
mentions the example of the vindicatory action: nothing would seem to belong 
more to the state law than an action which states ‘condemn the defendant if it 
appears that the disputed thing belongs to the plaintiff by Quiritary right.’ And 
yet the additional clause added by the praetor – ‘unless the thing is restored to 
the plaintiff according to [the judge’s] direction’ – utterly transforms the 
action. The praetor was called upon to innovate here because, without his 
intervention, the judge would be permitted to condemn only in money 
damages, and this could not be a satisfactory remedy in every case. But in 
allowing restitution at the judge’s direction (arbitrium), the resulting 
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‘discretionary action’ becomes difficult to classify firmly as either state-law or 
honorary. 
A comparison between a Roman magistrate’s power to innovate and the 
historical equity jurisdiction of the English Chancellor is unavoidable. In 
many respects the distinction between the state law and the honorary law 
resembles that between the common law and equity in England. But there is 
less to this resemblance than first appears. The Roman magistrate presided 
over both types of action and therefore, as Buckland
18 says, ‘We shall not find 
in the Roman law a system of rules developed gradually by a permanent 
tribunal whose function it was to give relief which for any reason could not be 
obtained in the ordinary courts’. Also, when we consider that some of the 
innovations introduced by the praetor out of a desire for equity would then be 
memorialised in his edict for future cases, the praetor resembles more a 
legislator than a chancellor. Finally, it is a fair argument that the greater source 
of equity in Roman law is not the praetor but the jurists, whose innovations 
would be felt principally in the second, trial phase of a lawsuit.
19 
VI.  Restorative, Penal, and Hybrid Actions (J.4.6.16 – 19; 4.12.1) 
This classification is based on the object of the litigation. As the Institutes 
explains, some actions are directed to providing compensation, some to <224> 
inflicting a penalty, and some to both of these things. A cynical reader may 
come to the conclusion that there is too much classification here. The aim of 
the discussion, in the end, seems to be to identify the minority of actions that 
are either wholly or partly penal, and to indicate the consequences of bringing 
such actions. 
A restorative action is one which would give to the plaintiff an award that 
does not exceed his loss. This may seem like a roundabout way of describing 
something fairly simple, but in fact the definition must be put carefully. The 
Institutes gives the example of an action for the death of a slave under the 
Aquilian Act (J.4.6.19). Under the action the slave, in a given case, might be 
valued higher than his worth at death, and the difference between the two 
values would be regarded as penal. We might treat this as a question of 
valuation and view the owner of the slave as overcompensated rather than 
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avenged, but that is not how the matter is treated in the Institutes. Perhaps 
what this discussion best illustrates is that restorative actions are defined by 
what they are not (neither penal nor hybrid), and that time is better spent 
identifying actions that are wholly or partly penal. Most actions, after all, are 
restorative. In general, real actions and contractual actions fall into this class, 
leaving delictual actions as penal or hybrid. 
A penal action typically will (1) exact a sum greater than the amount of the 
loss, as just described, or (2) exact a multiple of the loss. The fact that they 
were viewed as inflicting a penalty led to certain other features. The first 
concerns the matter of transmissibility. The issue arises when a person who 
might have become a plaintiff or defendant dies before issue is joined. In such 
a case an heir might be permitted to bring the action the decedent would have 
brought, or be vulnerable to the action that would have been brought against 
the decedent. If the action is one that permits an heir to assert the decedent’s 
claim, it is said to be actively transmissible. If it is one that permits an heir to 
have a claim asserted against him, it is said to be passively transmissible. The 
general rule was that restorative actions were both actively and passively 
transmissible, but that penal actions were only actively transmissible. The rule 
of course reflects the idea that only the wrongdoer himself should be punished. 
An exception was made for contempt: it was neither passively nor actively 
transmissible, in keeping with the notion that the outrage suffered by the 
victim of contempt belongs to him alone. 
The second feature was that, if more than one person were liable under 
such an action, both were liable in full, so that satisfaction by one did not 
release the others. If for example two persons had committed a non-manifest 
theft, each was liable for the double penalty. The rationale is the converse of 
that for the previous rule: just as it makes no sense to punish someone who did 
not commit the act, it makes no sense to spare someone who did. <225> 
The third feature is that a penal action permitted noxal surrender. This is 
discussed below. 
The Institutes glosses over what is actually at issue here, and presents the 
distinction between penal and restorative actions (almost) as a purely 
academic matter of classification. The real issue is bar. In general a person 
was not permitted to pursue two actions on the same matter. As soon as a 
dispute had passed the point at which issue was joined (the conclusion of the 
proceedings before the magistrate), a litigant could not raise the matter again. 
But this rule held true only for multiple restorative actions, or multiple penal 
actions. A person was permitted to bring both a restorative action and a penal 
action on the same matter, and hence the importance of identifying which 
actions were penal, wholly or in part. For example, a victim of theft could 22 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
bring both an actio furti (penal) to punish the thief and a rei vindicatio 
(restorative) to the get the thing back, but not a rei vindicatio and a condictio 
furtiva (restorative). 
Given the bar of multiple actions, it was particularly important to identify 
which actions were ‘hybrid’, that is, both restorative and penal.
20 A hybrid 
action would bar any further suit, of either type, on the same matter. One 
particular hybrid action both illustrates the usefulness of the classification 
‘hybrid’ and betrays the true purpose of the restorative/penal/hybrid 
classification. The Institutes gives the action on robbery as an example of a 
hybrid action (J.4.6.19). It is a hybrid action because, of the fourfold penalty 
inflicted on the defendant, only three parts are considered to be a penalty. 
Centuries earlier Gaius had discussed the same subject, but unlike Justinian 
omitted robbery from his examples of actions ‘both restorative and penal’ (the 
term ‘hybrid’ not then existing). Instead, he included robbery among the 
purely penal actions, explaining that ‘in the opinion of some’ that is where it 
belonged (G.4.8). To say ‘in the opinion of some’ is tantamount to saying that 
in the opinion of others the action on robbery ought to be classed as both penal 
and restorative (it being beyond argument that anyone would class it as 
restorative alone). 
Yet the dispute over how the action on robbery ought to be classified had 
nothing to do with classifications per se. The true issue was probably whether 
a robber could be treated as a ‘thief’ and sued by the condictio furtiva, a 
restorative action one brought against thieves. If a robber were a thief, the 
condictio furtiva would be available unless the action on robbery were deemed 
to be restorative in part, in which event it would bar any further restorative 
action. In short, what is presented as a scholarly disagreement over 
classifications is in fact an argument over bar, something genuinely significant 
to a litigant. <226> 
VII. Other  Classifications  (J.4.6.28 – 30; 4.8) 
There are other classifications of actions which, unlike the classifications just 
given, are relevant only within certain areas of the law. That they are treated 
under the law of actions and not in the appropriate places under persons or 
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things may be explained by a desire to avoid repetition, or the fact that they 
present characteristic formulae which make them attractive to discuss as 
actions. 
The most important of these other classifications pertains to certain 
personal actions. These actions were classed as to whether they were ‘good-
faith’ or ‘strict-law’ (J.4.6.28 – 30). Superficially the difference was one of 
pleading, but the actions reflected a difference in substantive law as well. A 
strict-law action was characterised not by what it said but by what it did not 
say: the judge who presided in such an action could not consider any matters 
that were not a part of the pleadings, that is, the formula. If, for example, a 
defendant in a suit on a stipulation wished to argue that he was induced to give 
the stipulation by fraud or duress, or that his opponent had agreed not to 
pursue him, he would have to plead the matter expressly. The formula directed 
the judge very plainly to condemn the defendant if it appeared that the 
defendant ought to give a sum to the plaintiff. Accordingly, in the absence of 
special pleading, the judge would confine himself to examining the integrity of 
the stipulation. In a good-faith action, however, the judge was given far wider 
discretion to consider other defences, and this grant of discretion was an 
integral part of the formula. A formula in a good-faith action directed the 
judge to inquire what the defendant ought to give or do for the plaintiff in 
accordance with good faith. The addition of the words ‘in accordance with 
good faith’ (ex bona fide) distinguishes a good-faith action. The consequence 
of this addition is that a judge presiding, for example, in an action on sale, may 
absolve on his own motion a defendant who he believes was a victim of fraud 
when he agreed to purchase goods: such a defendant should not in good faith 
pay the purchase price. 
Certain specific actions were set apart and classed as good-faith actions. 
The most important of these were actions on obligations contracted by 
agreement, and those contracted by conduct, with the exception of mutuum. 
What Justinian describes as ‘noxal actions’ (J.4.8) might be more fully 
described as ‘actions that allow noxal surrender as a remedy’. The remedy 
arises in the context of delict, and resembles a ‘delictual mechanic’s lien’. A 
person sometimes becomes liable for a delict committed by someone else, 
either a slave or a person within his family authority. If the delict is one that 
allows noxal surrender, the person liable is permitted either to pay damages or 
surrender the wrongdoer to the victim. By Justinian’s time noxal surrender 
applied only to slaves, and not to children within authority. <227> 
The common explanation for the origins of noxal surrender is that liability 
for delict is based on revenge, and that the victim’s right to avenge his loss by 
seizing the wrongdoer could be forgone by the payment of a ransom. Whether 24 E.  Metzger  IusCivile.com 
 
this is the correct explanation or not, it is consistent with certain features of the 
remedy. In the case of a slave, the person held liable is the person who owned 
the slave at the time of the action. The owner at the time of the delict is free 
from liability when he ceases to own the slave. Thus the aim of the action is 
simply to satisfy the victim, consistent with the notion of revenge. The same 
notion is apparent in the additional rule that a person may not have a noxal 
action against a slave that he owns. 
The  Institutes (borrowing from Gaius, G.4.75) justifies noxal surrender 
very poorly, arguing that it is unfair for a slave to inflict a loss on his owner 
beyond his own value (J.4.8.2). The statement is not convincing as a piece of 
legal analysis, and even less as a historical explanation. As Holmes points out, 
noxal surrender was not introduced as a vehicle for limitation of liability. His 
analysis is charitable: ‘The Roman lawyers, not looking beyond their own 
system or their own time, drew on their wits for an explanation which would 
show that the law as they found it was reasonable’.
21 
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